In countries, where the peasants have no decisive Influence on the government, land reform is only instrumental towards achieving various objectives. As a result It loses Immediately of its Importance when these objectives can be reached in a different way or when the costs of utilizing this means appear to be too high. The Land Reform in the Philippines is such a case.
O
n September 21, 1972, President Marcos invalidated the constitution of the Philippines and placed the country under martial law. The whole country was declared Land Reform Area and, one month later, the "emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, transferring to them the ownership of the land they till" was decreed 1. The now controlled Philippine press compared these ordinances to those made by Lincoln to abolish slavery in the USA, as they put an end to "450 years of tenant bondage to the landlord" 2. The tenant-peasant was said to have recovered, at last, his "dignity and self-respect as human being" 3. But, was the exploitation of the peasants in the Philippines, which had been going on for centuries, actually brought to an end almost "...with one stroke of the presidential pen" as the Minister for Agrarian Reform, Estrella, jubilated? 4
Evolution of Agrarian Structure
The institutional agricultural change in the Philippines had led to the increasing proletarianization of the peasants. According to census reports [] the proportion of tenants on all agricultural farms increased from 3 p.c. (1903) to 55 p.c. (1960) and fell again to 44 p.c. (1970); 9 Institute of Rural Development, University of Goettingen.
1 Presidential Decree (PD), No. 2, Sept. 26, 1972, and No. 27, Oct. 21, 1972. :z Philippine Sunday Express (Manila), Oct. 22, 1972. 3 Bulletin Today (Manila), Nov. 22, 1972. [] the average size of peasant farms decreased during the sixties (1960:3.6 ha; 1970:3.4 
ha).
A minority of tenants, namely in central Luzon, tried again and again, by using political means as well as strikes, demonstrations, riots, revolts, support of revolutionary movements, to rebel against the deterioration of their situation. Although they rarely succeeded in achieving their actual objectives -as they were always neutralized by the military forces --and could, however, rarely be completely eliminated, the administrations of the country, from the US colonial administration , over the Commonwealth regime to the governments of the independent republic (since 1946), have repeatedly passed laws -as reaction to the revolt among the small peasants -which were either to improve the terms of lease or even to redistribute the land. But these, however, did not greatly influence the fate of the small peasants and could not even put a stop to the described trend.
Marcos' Intentions and Objectives
Marcos substantiated the proclamation of martial law with the necessity of bringing political as well as criminal violence and the guerilla -which threatened the system -under control and of being able to effect, at last, the long overdue reforms of the political, economic and social institu-tions 5. He put emphasis on the implementation of the agrarian reform, for the successful realization of which martial law was almost a prerequisite: " . . . Never has land reform succeeded, except under the power of martial law or powers similar to martial law, like military occupancy after a war of liberation or a dictatorship, outright." 6 Although, since 1969, class struggle and violent disputes had significantly increased, most of the observers agree that there was not an actual threat to the system, above all not by the maoist New People's Army, as Marcos pretended. On the contrary, Marcos, who since 1965 had been President and who had been reelected in 1969 as such for the first time in the history of the Philippines, found himself exposed, in his effort to achieve a further prolongation of his term of office, to the violent opposition of the traditional oligarchy to which he also belonged.
That oligarchy had had, until then, the ready capacity of restricting considerably the efficiency of the government so that it could not fulfil satisfactorily the functions which it had to assume in the framework of a modern capitalistic development (effective implementation of general conditions of law and order, expansion of the infrastructure and of the strategies of social pacification).
In that sense, the aggravation of the economic crisis and, connected with this, the growing social disputes since 1969/70, might have made a strengthening of the government and an expansion of its activities appear necessary for the longterm maintenance and development of the system. [ ] by generally improving the possibilities of investing capital (above all foreign capital as well).
To reduce martial law to an idiosyncratic variable of Marcos' personal struggle for power against the majority of the (remaining) traditional oligarchy rejecting him, as this was variously done 7, hardly does justice to this development. The loyalty of the army and of the security forces was and is the prerequisite for the realization of this bonapartist policy. However, this did not dispense the regime from the necessity of seeking a basis among the broad mass of the population. Hence, the attempt was made at developing a populist reform strategy and to establish direct pseudodemocratic relations between the executive and the population. Of course, this cannot be confounded with genuine interest in the fate of broad masses of the population.
From the political angle, it was the task of land reform to break the fundamental power of the traditional (land possessing) oligarchy, to bind the rural masses by ideology and organization to the regime and to remove the basis of social disquiet among the rural sub-groups, which, until then, government had not been able to stamp out in a different way.
Economic and Social Impacts
From the economic point of view, as the most important element -as this was always emphasized -of an integrated policy of agrarian reform, it was to create the prerequisite for an increase of agricultural productivity and of rural income which, in turn, would constitute an important condition (contribution to balance of payments and to capital accumulation, to employment, development of a local market for industrial goods) for a development strategy involving all social classes. The distributive element in this agrarian (reform) policy in general and in this land reform policy in particular thus had, right from the start, a subordinate priority only as compared to the other objectives (centralization of power, production increase).
Even the martial law regime is not revolutionary in the true sense. It does not try to bring about a fundamental overturn of the social conditions, but only their gradual shifting and better control by the government setup. David F. Roth's assumption that Marcos, like Cardenas in Mexico, could arm a peasant militia 8 is rather inapt. Although 7 The Economist Intelligence Unit: Quarterly Economic Review: Philippines, Taiwan, 1972, No. 7 ; Jean G r o s s h o l t z , Philippines 1973 : Whither Marcos?, in: Asian Survey, 1974 
